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Case No. 20140812-CA 
IN THE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
TIM G. WAGER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of 
methamphetamine, enhanced to a second degree felony; and possession of 
marijuana, a class A misde1neanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2014). 
INTRODUCTION 
While executing a search warrant on Wager's house, officers found 
marijuana on his bedroom dresser in a pill bottle that had his name on the 
prescription label. Wager lived with a roon1mate, but the two had separate 
bedrooms. In Wager's garage, officers found 1netha1nphetan1ine stored next 
to Wager's power tools in a locked cabinet. Wager kept a key to the cabinet 
on his keychain. The roommate did not have a key to the cabinet. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Wager testified at trial and denied that the drugs were his. He 
clain1ed that no one used drugs in his house. The State sought to impeach 
this testilnony with a photograph of him in his bathroom where he appears 
to be smoking an illegal substance. The State offered the photograph 
through the arresting officer, who obtained it from Wager's ex-fiance. The 
officer, while searching Wager's house, took a photograph of the same 
bathroom. The trial court allowed both photographs. Wager challenges 
only the admission of the photograph with him in it. 
Issue 1: Does rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence-which does not 
apply to evidence used to ilnpeach testimony- bar the photograph's 
ad1nission? 
Standard of review. This Court grants a h·ial court "broad discretion to 
admit or exclude evidence and will disturb its ruling only for an abuse of 
discretion." Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, if 17, 127 P.3d 382. 
Issue 2: Was the photograph properly authenticated? 
Standard of review. Saine. 
Issue 3: Should this Court address Wager's unpreserved and 
inadequately briefed claim that the photograph violates best evidence? 




Issue 4: Should this Court address Wager's unpreserved and 
inadequately briefed claim that the State should have provided pretrial 
notice of the photograph? 
No standard of review applies. 
Issue 5: Was any error in the photograph's admission harmless? 
Standard of review: This Court will not overturn a jury verdict for the 
admission of improper evidence if it "did not reasonably [a]ffect the 
likelihood of a different verdict." State v. Housekeeper, 2002 UT 118, if 26, 62 
P.3d 444. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah R. Evid. 401 (relevance) 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (unfair prejudice) 
Utah R. Evid. 608 (witness's character for truthfulness) 
Utah R. Evid. 901 (authentication) 
Utah R. Evid. 1002 (best evidence) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Officers find marijuana in Wager's bedroom and methamphetamine in his garage 
Officers began surveilling Wager's house after receiving tips of drug 
activity occurring there. Rl 99:69. About a 1nonth into the surveillance, 
,, 
<)-
officers conducted a "trash cover," where they removed Wager's garbage 
bin frmn the curb and inspected its contents. 1 R199:70-71. 
Among the waste, officers found two pipes containing 
methamphetamine residue and a bong used for smoking marijuana. 
Rl 99:71; St's Ex. (SE) 22. They also found a bank statement addressed to 
Wager. R199:71, SE1. 
Officers obtained a warrant to search Wager's house. R199:72-73. 
They found marijuana on his bedroom dresser. R199:74-75; SE3. It was 
kept in a prescription pill bottle that had Wager's name on the pharmacy 
label. R199:74-75; SE3. 
In Wager's garage, officers found a red cabinet that was locked. 
R199:78. \t\Tager provided officers with the key, which he kept on his 
keychain. Rl 99:73,78. \,\Then officers opened the cabinet, they found a 
wooden box that held several small plastic baggies containing 
1nethamphetamine. Rl 99:79-80; SES. Wager also kept several power tools 
in the cabinet. R199:78,138; SES. 
1 Both the federal and state constitutions allow for a warrantless 
search and seizure of garbage left for collection beyond the curtilage of a 
home. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988); State v. Jackson, 937 
P.3d 545, 549-50 (Utah App. 1997). 
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Lacy Singleton, Wager's roommate and ex-girlfriend, was at the 
house during the search. R199:74. Singleton had a separate bedroom, 
'"rhere officers found marijuana paraphernalia. Rl 99:98, 136, 165-66. 
Singleton did not have a key to the garage cabinet. R199:98. 
Wager and Singleton had lived in the house for less than a year before 
the arrest and search. R199:70,94-95,145. 
Wager's version 
At trial, Wager disclaimed any knowledge of the drugs being in his 
house and sought to establish that the methamphetamine belonged to his 
ex-fiance, Jenny Stewart, who lived at the house "off and on." 
Rl 99:118,139,146-47, 162. 
Wager first called his room1nate, Singleton, to testify. Id. Singleton 
said that Stewart had left the house about a week before the police search. 
Rl 99:118,122. According to Singleton, Stewart left behind a pile of 
belongings, which included "son1e glass things" that Singleton claimed 
were drug paraphernalia. R199:122-23. Singleton claiined that after Stewart 
left, she "broke it all up" and threw it into the h·ash. Rl 99:123. 
When asked why she did that, Singleton said, "because it's illegal and 
we don't do drugs and I didn't want it there." Id. Singleton also testified 
that Stewart was jealous of her for taking care of Wager, who was legally 
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blind. R199:118,123. On cross-examination, Singleton admitted to calling 
DCFS on Stewart for rnistreating her children. R199:135-36. 
Singleton claimed that Stewart also had a key to the red cabinet in the 
garage and that the wooden box belonged to Stewart, not Wager. Rl 99:125-
26,138. 
Wager also testified. R199:139. He claimed that he did not know that 
the pill bottle found in his bedromn contained marijuana or that the wooden 
box found in the garage contained methamphetamine. R199:139,162. 
During cross-examination, Wager denied that anyone in the house 
used methamphetamines or other drugs. R199:146-47,162. He testified that 
he "wouldn't allow it." R199:146. Immediately following Wager's denial, 
the prosecutor asked for a recess. Rl 99:146-47,162. 
Admission of photographs 
During the recess, the prosecutor informed the h·ial court that he had 
a photograph of Wager smoking what appeared to be methampheta1nine in 
the bathroon1 of his house. R199:148; SE24 (attached at Addendum B). The 
prosecutor argued that Wager had opened the door to this evidence and 
sought to ad1nit it through Officer Sanderson, who had obtained it from 
Stewart, Wager's ex-fiance. Rl 99:148,150. 
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The prosecutor later proffered a second photograph, which Officer 
Sanderson had taken while conducting the search of Wager's house. 
R199:152. It showed Wager's bathroo1n without anyone in it. R199:152; 
SE23 (attached at Addendum B). 
Defense counsel objected that Officer Sanderson could not provide 
sufficient foundation for the first photograph. Id. 
The Court initially stated that under rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
the prosecutor could "pose the question directly, but I don't believe that you 
can bring extrinsic evidence." Rl 99:151. Defense counsel agreed and asked 
the court to "[a]dd that to the list" of his objections. Id. But the court later 
reversed its ruling by detennining that rule 608 did not apply because there 
had been no "challenge to truthfulness." R199:152. 
Defense counsel nevertheless appeared to maintain his objection that 
the photograph was inadmissible under rule 608. R199:156 (Defense 
counsel stating that" A, it shouldn't con1e in at all; B, I still don't think it-
608(b), exh·insic evidence is relevant. But if it comes in, this is a mistrial"). 
However, defense counsel agreed that the evidence was relevant for 
impeachn1ent purposes. R199:161 (Defense counsel: "It's relevant, I guess, 
but it doesn't have the foundation for ad1nission"). 
-7-
The court ruled that both photographs were admissible. It first 
determined that Wager had opened the door to this evidence and that it was 
admissible to i1npeach his testimony. R199:156-57. 
The court then concluded that Officer Sanderson could properly 
authenticate the two photographs given his first-hand knowledge of the 
room where the photographs were taken and of Wager as the individual 
shown in the earlier photograph. R199:156-57,175-76. Noting the 
similarities between the two photographs, the court concluded that 
Sanderson could provide sufficient foundation for their admission. 
R199:153. The court rejected defense counsel's argument that Officer 
Sanderson could not authenticate the earlier photograph because he did not 
take it. R199:156-57. 
Defense counsel then sought to introduce a notarized affidavit from 
Wager's ex-fiance, Stewart, claiining that Officer Sanderson tried to get 
information from her "to set Tim up." Id.; Def's Ex. (DE) 2. R199:158. The 
court rejected the affidavit as inadmissible hearsay. Id. 
At the close of the defense's case in chief, the State called Officer 
Sanderson as a rebuttal wih1ess and presented both photographs of Wager's 
bathroom. R199:164. The State first presented the photograph taken the 
day the search warrant was executed. Rl 99:167. Officer Sanderson testified 
-8-
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that he took the photograph and described the location of the bathroom in 
reference to other rooms in Wager's house. Id. 
The State then presented the photograph of Wager in the bathroom. 
R199:168-69. Officer Sanderson testified that it was same bathroom and that 
Wager was the person in the photograph. Id. Sanderson did not opine-
nor did the prosecutor ask-about what Wager was doing in the 
photograph. Id. 
Defense counsel reiterated his objection that the photograph was not 
properly authenticated. Id. 
During cross-examination, Sanderson admitted that he did not know 
the date the photograph was taken. R199:170. 
The jury convicts 
In closing argu1nent, the prosecutor relied on a consh·uctive 
possession theory to argue that Wager was guilty of both the marijuana and 
1nethampheta1nine possession counts. R199:191-92. The prosecutor did not 
initially mention the photograph of Wager in the bathroom. Id. 
Defense counsel argued that the drugs belonged to Stewart and that 
Wager had no knowledge of them being in the house. R199:192-93. 
Counsel challenged the relevance of the photograph showing Wager in the 
bathroom. R199:196-97. Counsel argued that it was not clear what Wager 
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was doing in the photograph, that the State had not been able to date the 
photograph, and that it had nothing to do with Wager's current possession 
charges. Id. 
During rebuttal, the prosecutor showed the jury the photograph of 
Wager to refute his testimony that no drugs were used in his home. 
R199:200-01. 
The jury convicted Wager on both counts. R90-91; R199:204. 
In a bifurcated hearing, the court enhanced Wager's 
methamphetamine possession conviction to a second degree felony based 
on evidence of two prior convictions for possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to dish·ibute, second degree felonies. SE25; R199:205; 
see Utah Code Aru1. § 58-37-8(2)(c) (providing for enhancement of simple 
possession by one degree based upon prior conviction for possession with 
intent to distribute). 
The trial court sentenced Wager to one-to-fifteen years' prison for 
possession of methamphetamine and 365 days' jail for possession of 
marijuana, but suspended the entire sentence in favor of 10 days' jail with 
three years' probation. R178-80. 
Wager thnely appealed. R183. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point 1: Wager argues that the trial court should have excluded the 
photograph under rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence. But rule 608 does not 
apply because the photograph was not offered to prove Wager's general 
character for untruthfulness; it was offered to impeach Wager's specific 
testimony that no one used drugs in his house. It is well settled that the 
prosecution may introduce rebuttal evidence to contradict or cast doubt 
upon the credibility of a defendant's testimony. The trial court properly 
allowed the photograph for that limited purpose. Any prejudice in 
ad1nitting the photograph did not substantially outweigh its impeachment 
value. 
Point 2: Wager next argues that the photograph was iinproperly 
authenticated because the officer through whom it was offered did not take 
it and did not know the precise date it was taken. But the State needed only 
to establish that the photograph was what it purported to be- a photograph 
of Wager in his bathroom. The State did this by first laying foundation with 
a later photograph of Wager's empty bathromn taken by the officer who 
searched his house. The State then introduced the photograph of Wager, 
whon1 the officer identified as being in the same bathromn. The officer also 
testified that Wager's ex-fiance gave him the photograph. The jury knew 
-11-
that Wager had lived in the house for less than a year before his arrest. This 
was sufficient for purposes of authentication. 
Points 3 & 4: Wager's arguments that the photograph violated best 
evidence and that the State should have provided him preh·ial notice of this 
evidence are unpreserved and inadequately briefed and should not be 
addressed. Even if reached, both claims fail plain error scrutiny because the 
best evidence rule does not apply and the record suggests that Wager did, 
in fact, receive the photograph before trial. 
Point 5: Any error in the photograph's admission was harmless 
where other evidence already undermined his testimony and amply 
supported both possession convictions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The trial court properly admitted an impeaching photograph 
of Wager. 
Wager argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a 
photograph showing him smoking what appears to be an illegal substance 
in his bathroom. Br.Aplt. 7-12. Wager asserts that the photograph was 
inad1nissible under rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence, and that it was not 
properly authenticated under rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence. Id. He also 
appears to clain1 for the first time on appeal that the h·ial court erred by not 
-12-
. J 
sua sponte excluding the photograph under Utah's best evidence rule and 
that the State was required to give him pretrial notice of its intent to 
introduce the photograph. 
But the trial court acted well within its discretion in determining that 
rule 608 did not bar the photograph's admission and that the State properly 
authenticated it. The court should not address Wager's remaining best 
evidence and notice challenges because they are unpreserved and Wager 
argues no appellate justification for review. These challenges are also 
inadequately briefed. In any event, Wager cannot demonstrate that the 
verdict would likely have been any different had the photograph been 
suppressed. 
A. The trial court properly admitted the photograph of Wager 
for the limited purpose of impeaching his testimony that 
no one used drugs in his house. 
Wager argues that the photograph of him in his bathroom violated 
rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence, because it constituted extrinsic evidence 
intended to impermissibly prove his character for untruthfulness. Br.Aplt. 
at 10-11. Wager also argues that the photograph was irrelevant to his 
possession charges and prejudicial. Br.Aplt. 7-9. 
But Wager has 1nisunderstood the photograph's import. It was not 
offered to prove his general character for h·uthfulness. Rather, the State 
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offered it to directly refute his trial testimony that no one used drugs in his 
house. R199:148-50. Rule 608 thus did not apply. And Wager conceded 
below that the photograph was relevant for impeachment purposes. This 
was the sole relevance inquiry. His complaint that the photograph did not 
bear on his possession charges is correct, but wide of the point. And the test 
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, is not whether the evidence is 
"prejudicial," but whether it is unfairly prejudicial-Le., whether the 
prejudicial value of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative 
value. Any prejudice arising from the photograph's admission here did not 
substantially outweigh its impeachment value. 
Rule 608 prohibits the admission of extrinsic evidence when it is used 
"to prove specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to attack or 
support the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness." Utah R. 
Evid. 608(b). This ban applies "' only when the specific act is being used to 
show character."' State v. Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ~28, 318 P.3d 1221. 
When the exh·insic evidence is being offered for a proper non-character 
purpose- such as to directly rebut or cast doubt upon a wih1ess' s 
testimony-it is not covered by the ban. Id. i[29. Once the defendant 
"1nakes an assertion as to any fact," the State may "introduce on rebuttal 
any testimony or evidence 'which would tend to contradict, explain or cast 
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doubt upon the credibility of his testimony."' Id. il30 (quoting State v. Green, 
578 P.2d 512,514 (Utah 1978)). 
Here, the State presented the photograph of Wager through its 
rebuttal witness, Officer Sanderson, to impeach Wager's testimony that 
nobody in his house used 1nethamphetamine or other drugs. R199:148-50. 
The photograph was not offered to prove character, but rather for the 
limited purpose of rebutting Wager's testimony. Thus, rule 608 did not 
apply, and the trial court properly admitted the photograph as non-
character impeachment evidence. 
Wager nevertheless c01nplains that the photograph was not relevant 
to proving his possession charges because the State did not show that it was 
taken on the date alleged in the infonnation. Br.Aplt. 9. Wager's argument 
is correct, but inconsequential 
Even if evidence is intended for a proper purpose, it must also be 
relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. State v. Housekeeper, 2002 UT 118, if 29, 
62 P.3d 444. Evidence is relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action." Utah R. Evid. 401. Here, the State 
did not offer the photograph to prove counts on the information. It offered 
it for the limited purpose of rebutting Wager's testimony that he would not 
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allow people to s1noke methamphetamine or use other drugs in his house. 
R199:148-50. Wager conceded at trial that the photograph was relevant for 
this purpose. R199:161. His concession ends the relevance inquiry. 
Wager claims that the photograph was "prejudicial," although he 
does not explain why he thinks so. Br.Aplt. 8-9. In any event, the question 
is not whether the evidence was prejudicial, but whether it was unfairly 
prejudicial. Rule 403 requires that relevant evidence be excluded if "its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403. Officer Sanderson's testimony about the 
photograph was limited to identifying Wager and his bathroom in the 
photograph and Wager's ex-fiance as the person from whom the 
photograph was obtained. The prosecutor did not ask Sanderson about the 
photograph beyond those facts. Defense counsel further minimized any 
prejudicial effect of this evidence by eliciting during cross-examination that 
Sanderson did not know when the photograph was taken, and by arguing 
during closing that it had nothing to do with his current possession charges. 
R199:170. Certainly, the potential prejudice of the evidence did not 





B. The State properly authenticated the impeaching 
photograph. 
Wager argues that the photograph was not properly authenticated 
under rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence. Br.Aplt. 8-9. Since Officer 
Sanderson did not take the photograph and could not say precisely when it 
was taken, Wager concludes that Sanderson could not lay proper 
foundation for its admission. Id. But Wager asks for much more than the 
rule requires. 
Rule 901(a) requires that the proponent of an item of evidence 
authenticate it with "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is 
what the proponent claims it is." Testimony from a witness with 
knowledge "that an item is what it is claimed to be" satisfies the 
requirement. Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(1). If "a c01npetent witness with 
personal knowledge of the facts represented by a photograph testifies that 
the photograph accurately reflects those facts, it is admissible." State v. 
Purcell, 711 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1985) (citation on1itted). 
Here, the State presented two photographs, both through Officer 
Sanderson. The first showed Wager's empty bathro01n on the day officers 
searched his house. R199:167-68; St's Ex. 23. Officer Sanderson testified that 
he took this photograph during the search. R199:167. 
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The first photograph laid foundation for the second, which showed 
Wager in his bathromn where he appeared to be smoking drugs. R199:168; 
St's Ex. 24. Officer Sanderson testified that he received this photograph 
from Stewart, Wager's ex-fiance, and that it showed the same bathroom 
only now with Wager in it. R199:139-40,121,168,169. Officer Sanderson did 
not testify-nor did the prosecutor ask-about what Wager was doing in 
the bathroom. 
Wager nowhere asserts that Officer Sanderson was not competent to 
testify about the photographs. Nor does he contend that Officer Sanderson 
lacked personal knowledge of the bathroom-which he searched-or of 
Wager-whom he arrested and later identified a trial. Although Officer 
Sanderson lacked personal knowledge· of the event depicted in the 
photograph as it occurred, he had sufficient knowledge of the location and 
individual to authenticate it. 
The State was not required to provide an exact date on which the 
photograph was taken. See Shiozawa v. Duke, 2015 UT App 40, if21, 344 P.3d 
1174 (holding "absence of an exact date" did not render inadmissible 
photographs of latent foundation cracks in real estate dispute); see also 
Purcell, 711 P.2d at 245 (holding photographs of stolen furniture properly 
authenticated despite "minor discrepancies" in the testimony, which "went 
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only to details of the time and place the pictures were taken"). Wager lived 
in the house for less than a year before his arrest. R199:70,94-95,145. Jurors 
thus had a date range for when the photograph was taken. R199:153. 
Anything more precise was unnecessary and would not have altered the 
photograph's impeach1nent value, which went to Wager's open-ended 
denial of drug use in the house. 
Nor does it matter that Officer Sanderson did not take the impeaching 
photograph and was not present when it was taken. Br.Aplt. 8. Sanderson 
had only to establish that the contents of the photograph were what they 
purported to be. Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(l). As shown, he satisfied that 
requirement by identifying Wager's ex-fiance as the person who gave him 
the photograph, then identifying the location and individual pictured in it. 
Cf Jackson v. State, 714 S.E.2d 584,589 (Ga. 2011) (holding that "any witness 
familiar with the subject depicted can authenticate a photograph; the 
witness need not be the photographer nor have been present when the 
photograph was taken") (citation and quotations omitted). 
Wager 1nisplaces reliance on State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah 1993), 
when arguing lack of authenticity. There, the supre1ne court affirmed the 
exclusion of a photograph offered by Horton to show that the h·unk of his 
vehicle was too small to transport stolen ite1ns. Id. at 713-14. The supreme 
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court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining 
that the photograph did not accurately depict the trunk. Id. at 714. 
Wager, however, does not dispute that the impeaching photograph 
accurately depicts his bathroom and him inside it. And the trial court here, 
after noting the similarities between the two photographs of the bathroom, 
concluded that Officer Sanderson could provide sufficient foundation for 
both. Horton affords Wager nothing. 
C. This Court should not address Wager's unpreserved and 
inadequately briefed argument that the State was required 
to produce an original of the impeaching photograph. 
Wager claims for the first tilne on appeal that the trial court did not 
consider other rules that can apply to photographic evidence-namely, 
Utah Rules of Evidence 1002, 1004, and 1007. Br.Aplt. 9-10. Wager appears 
to argue that, under these rules, the State was required to produce an 
original of the impeaching photograph. Id. This Court should not consider 
Wager's late invocation of the best evidence rule because he never gave the 
h·ial court an opportunity to address it and he argues no justification for 
a pp ell ate review. 
11 As a general rule, claims not raised before the h·ial court 1nay not be 
raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ~11, 10 P.3d 346. This rule 
serves two purposes: "(1) it enhances efficiency and fairness and (2) it 
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'generally assure[s] that most claims are raised and resolved in the first 
instance by the original trial court."' Oseguera v. State, 2014 UT 31, ,llO, 332 
P.3d 963 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, ,l19, 274 
P.3d 919). To preserve an issue for appeal, "the issue must be presented to 
the h·ial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule 
on that issue." 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,I51, 99 P.3d 
801 ( citation and quotations omitted). 
Wager never raised a best evidence objection to the photograph at 
h·ial. And he does not argue plain error or any other justification for his 
preservation failure now. Because Wager has not articulated '" an 
appropriate justification for appellate review"' of his best evidence claim, 
this Court should not address it. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ,114, 128 P.3d 
1171 (quoting State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, if 45, 114 P.3d 551); see also State v. 
Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ,I36 n.6, 122 P.3d 543; State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 
n.5 (Utah 1995). 
Wager's best evidence argument is also inadequately briefed. Rule 
24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires a defendant's brief to 
"contain ... citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on." An "appellate court is not 'a depository in which [a party] may 
dump the burden of argument and research."' Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, il 9, 
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194 P.3d 903 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Briefing is 
inadequate when "it 1nerely contains bald citations to authority" without 
"development of that authority." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). If a 
party "fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [ the court will] decline to reach 
the 1nerits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, ~12, 52 P.3d 467. 
While Wager quotes rules 1002, 1004, and 1007, he never goes so far 
as to say that the State violated the best evidence rule by not producing an 
original photograph. Instead, he merely complains that the trial court did 
not consider these rules. Br.Aplt. 9-10. But, as shown, the trial court did not 
consider them because Wager never invoked them at trial. And he does not 
develop these authorities now with reasoned analysis to show how the State 
could have violated the best evidence rule. His briefing of this issue is 
inadequate and does not warrant merits review. 
Even if this Court were to overlook Wager's preservation and briefing 
failures, he cannot de1nonsh~ate plain error. To do so, he would have to 
show obvious, prejudicial error. See State v. Candland, 2013 UT 55, ~22, 309 
P.3d 230. An error "is obvious only if the law governing the error was clear 
at the time the alleged error was 1nade." State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,r37, 
299 P.3d 892 (citation and quotations omitted). Wager cannot meet this high 
standard because the best evidence rule applies to photographs only in the 
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rare instance when testimony about a photograph is offered as evidence but 
the photograph is not. And Wager has not demonstrated that, absent the 
photograph's admission, he probably would have been acquitted. 
Under the best evidence rule, an "original writing, recording, or 
photograph is required in order to prove its content, except as otherwise 
provided in these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of 
this State or by statute." Utah R. Evid. 1002. "Usually when counsel seeks 
to introduce a photograph, the best evidence rule is not implicated because 
the contents of the photograph itself are not in issue." 3 Wharton's Criminal 
Evidence § 15:4 (15th ed.). Indeed, the best evidence rule "will seldom 
apply to ordinary photographs." Fed. R. Evid. 1002 advisory committee's 
note. This is because, in "most instances a party wishes to introduce the iten1 
and the question raised is the propriety of receivin.g it in evidence." Id. The 
rule applies only in rare instances when a party proffers testimony from a 
witness about "what he saw in a photograph or motion picture, without 
producing the sa1ne." Id. 
Here, the State produced not one, but two photographs of Wager's 
bathromn through Officer Sanderson, who testified about their contents. 
This was not one of those rare situations where a wih1ess testifies about the 
contents of an absent photograph. Thus, the best evidence rule did not 
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apply, and the court committed no error-let alone obvious-error- by not 
sua sponte excluding the photograph of Wager on best evidence grounds. 
At bottom, Wager identifies no law-nor is the State aware of any-that 
clearly requires originals of photographs over their copies when a witness 
can testify about their contents. 
D. This Court should not address Wager's unpreserved and 
inadequately briefed argument that the State was required 
to provide pre-trial notice of the impeaching photograph. 
Wager argues, in a single sentence unsupported by reference to the 
record or law, that the State should have provided him advance notice of its 
intent to use the photograph of him at trial. Br.Aplt. 10-11. He claims that 
the State should have 1noved to admit it in limine, allowing him to 
subpoena his ex-Hance, who gave the photograph to Officer Sanderson. Id. 
Wager's notice claim is unpreserved because he never raised this 
challenge below or requested a continuance to subpoena Stewart when the 
State proffered the photograph mid-trial. Wager fails to argue any 
justification for appellate review of his unpreserved notice claim. This 
Court should not review it. See Winfield, 2006 UT 4, if 14. 
His notice argmnent is also inadequately briefed. As stated, briefing 
is inadequate "if it 111erely contains bald citations to authority" without 
"development of that authority." Allen, 2008 UT 56, if 9 ( quotations and 
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citation omitted). When an appellant fails to present any relevant authority, 
the reviewing court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 
UT 24, ~12, 69 P.3d 1278. This Court simply "will not engage in 
constructing arguments 'out of whole cloth' on behalf of defendants." State 
v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted). Wager's 
complaint that the State gave him inadequate notice is limited to a single 
sentence bereft of any citation to the record or legal support. His cursory 
and inadequate treatment of this issue is reason alone to decline its review. 
Even if this Court were to excuse Wager's twin failures, he cannot 
demonstrate plain error because he fails to establish that he did not, in fact, 
receive pretrial notice of the photograph. The record supports the contrary 
inference. Defense counsel was prepared to meet the impeaching 
photograph at h·ial with an affidavit from Stewart, Wager's ex-fiance, who 
gave Sanderson the photograph. Rl 99:158. In the affidavit, Stewart claims 
that Officer Sanderson tried to get information from her "to set Tim up." 
Id.; DE2. Counsel's preparedness to address the impeaching photograph 
with this information supports an inference that he had received or knew 
about the photograph before trial, which was only a one-day affair. 
In any event, Wager cannot rely on gaps in the record to show that 
the trial court committed obvious error by not sua sponte raising a notice 
-25-
complaint for him. See State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ~43, 154 P.3d 788 (rejecting 
plain error claim because "given the paucity" of pertinent information in the 
record, any error "was far frmn obvious"). 
Wager also identifies no rule that required the State to provide, 
without request, pretrial notice of impeachment evidence that was 
unfavorable to Wager. Indeed, "a Brady violation occurs only where the 
state suppresses information that (1) remains unknown to the defense both 
before and throughout trial and (2) is material and exculpatory." State v. 
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ~36, 37 P.3d 1073. Defendant knew of the photograph as 
early as h·ial and it was inculpatory. Thus, the State did not violate Brady, 
much less obviously so. 
And while rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, requires "reasonable 
notice" for prior acts evidence, it gives the trial court discretion to allow 
midtrial disclosure of the evidence upon "good cause shown." Utah R. 
Evid. 404(b)(2)(B). As shown, the existing record supports an inference that 
the State had given Wager pretrial notice of the photograph. But even 
assuming midtrial disclosure, Wager has not argued-let alone 
de1nonsh·ated-that the State lacked good cause. Again, any record gaps 
here 1nust be consh·ued against Wager. See Powell, 2007 UT 9, if 43. 
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E. Any error in the photograph's admission was harmless. 
·wager cannot show that, absent admission of the impeaching 
photograph, the jury likely would have acquitted him. See Horton, 848 P.2d 
at 714 n.5 (applying harmless error to authentication challenge); State v. 
Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, ,i34, 163 P.3d 695 ( declining to reverse despite 
hnproper admission of evidence because it did not reasonably affect 
likelihood of different verdict). The State presented evidence that officers 
found marijuana in Wager's prescription pill bottle on his bedroom dresser 
and 1nethamphetamine stored next to his power tools in a locked cabinet to 
which he had the key. This evidence amply supported Wager's possession 
convictions. And, together with drug paraphernalia found in his house and 
trash, this evidence already undennined ,Nager's testimony that he would 
not allow anyone to use drugs in his house. Wager cannot demonstrate a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have acquitted him on this 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affinn. 
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Utah R. Evid. 401. Definition Of "Relevant Evidence" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. Rule 403 Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of 
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
,._d 
Utah R. Evid. 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness 
may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, 
but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is 
admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been 
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, 
for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness, 
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative 
of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the 
witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, 
or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another 
witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does 
not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against 
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters that relate only to 
character for truthfulness. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced. 
Utah R. Evid. 901. Authenticating or Identifying Evidence 
(a) In General. To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an 
item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. 
(b) Examples. The following are exa1nples only--not a complete list--of evidence 
that satisfies the require1nent: 
(1) Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge. Testilnony that an item is what it is 
clahned to be. 
(2) Nonexpert Opinion About Handwriting. A nonexpert's opinion that 
handwriting is genuine, based on a familiarity with it that was not acquired 
for the current litigation. 
(3) Comparison by an Expert Witness or the Trier of Fact. A co1nparison with an 
authenticated specimen by an expert witness or the h·ier of fact. 
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance, 
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken 
together with all the circumstances. 
(5) Opinion About a Voice. An opinion identifying a person's voice--whether 
heard firsthand or through 1nechanical or electronic transmission or 
recording--based on hearing the voice at any tilne under circumstances that 
connect it with the alleged speaker. 
(6) Evidence About a Telephone Co11versatio11. For a telephone conversation, 
evidence that a call was 1nade to the number assigned at the tiine to: 
(A) a particular person, if circu1nstances, including self-identification,, 
show that the person answering was the one called; or 
(B) a particular business, if the call was made to a business and the call 
related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone. 
(7) E'uidence About Public Records. Evidence that: 
(A) a docmnent was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by 
law; or 
(B) a purported public record or statement is fro1n the office where iten1s 
of this kind are kept. 
(8) Euidence About Ancie1Zt Oocu111e1Zfs or Onta CompilntioHs. For a docmnent or 
data compilation, evidence that it: 
(A) is in a condition that creates no suspicion about its authenticity; 
(B) was in a place where, if authentic, it would likely be; and 
(C) is at least 20 years old when offered. 
(9) fa.1idence About n Process or System. Evidence describing a process or system 
and shm,ving that it produces an accurate result. 
(10) Methods Provided by a Statute or Rule. Any 1nethod of authentication or 








Utah R. Evid. 1002 Requirement of The Original 
An original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to prove its 
content, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by other rules adopted by 
the Supreme Court of this State or by statute. 
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